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Abstract. Peer-assisted content distribution networks (CDNs) have emerged
to improve performance and reduce deployment costs of traditional,
infrastructure-based content delivery networks. This is done by employ-
ing peer-to-peer data transfers to supplement the resources of the net-
work infrastructure. However, these hybrid systems are vulnerable to
accounting attacks in which the peers, or caches, collude with clients
in order to report that content was transferred when it was not. This
is a particular issue in systems that incentivize cache participation, be-
cause malicious caches may collect rewards from the content publishers
operating the CDN without doing any useful work.
In this paper, we introduce CAPnet, the first technique that lets un-
trusted caches join a peer-assisted CDN while providing a bound on the
effectiveness of accounting attacks. At its heart is a lightweight cache ac-
countability puzzle that clients must solve before caches are given credit.
This puzzle requires colocating the data a client has requested, so its so-
lution confirms that the content (or at least an amount of data within a
pre-configured bound) has actually been retrieved. We analyze the secu-
rity and overhead of our scheme in realistic scenarios. The results show
that a modest client machine using a single core can solve puzzles at
a rate sufficient to simultaneously watch dozens of 1080p videos. The
technique is designed to be even more scalable on the server side. In our
experiments, one core of a single low-end machine is able to generate
puzzles for 4.26 Tbps of bandwidth — enabling 870,000 clients to con-
currently view the same 1080p video. This demonstrates that our scheme
can ensure cache accountability without degrading system productivity.
1 Introduction
Online content distribution has grown dramatically over the last decade. Video
streaming, in particular accounts for more than 60% of today’s Internet traffic
and it is expected to exceed 80% by 2022 [3]. To meet this huge demand, content
publishers typically employ solutions that distribute the load among geographi-
cally dispersed caches. Among these solutions, infrastructure-based content de-
livery networks (CDNs) have proven effective [1, 4]. But as load continues to
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grow, pressure to improve performance and reduce cost has led to experimenta-
tion with more sophisticated topologies [13,18].
Peer-assisted CDNs have evolved to reduce these costs and also to allow
access to lower latency peers. In this model, centralized services are supplemented
with the resources of end users, or peers [12,24]. By allowing anyone to join, and
exchanging service for a payment, this paradigm creates robust, performant,
and flexible systems. In addition, peer-assisted solutions can extend the network
coverage of infrastructure-based CDNs, scale more easily with demand, and when
managed carefully, offer a good quality of service for end users [24]. Several
commercial CDN providers have built products that employ this approach, such
as Swarmify [8], Velocix [9], and Akamai NetSession [2].
However, peer-assisted work models are vulnerable to cache accounting at-
tacks [11, 19], in which a cache and client collude to defraud the content pub-
lisher by claiming to have transferred data (and claiming payment) when no
actual work has been done. This is a particular problem in content distribution
applications that do not require subscription fees from clients, such as ad-funded
video streaming [10], or services that allow a client to play content on multiple
devices under one subscription [6]. Some defenses against these attacks have
been proposed [11, 22], but they do not work in typical peer-to-peer scenarios,
where untrusted, anonymous nodes serve as caches.
In this paper, we introduce CAPnet, the first technique that lets untrusted
caches, such as peers with unknown computational and latency characteristics,
join a peer-assisted CDN while providing a bound on the effectiveness of ac-
counting attacks. Our key innovation is a lightweight cache accountability puzzle
that clients must solve before caches are given credit. The puzzle solution serves
as a content retrieval confirmation assuring publishers that the claimed content
transfer (or at least an amount of data within a pre-configured bound) has taken
place.
For each service request in CAPnet, the publisher generates a puzzle that
a client must solve by processing the data chunks retrieved from caches (each
of which is encrypted with a request-specific key). Solving this puzzle requires
the client to sequentially touch small pieces of these chunks in an unpredictable
order. Because of this unpredictability, the communication overhead of generat-
ing the solution without having the data colocated is significant. Combined with
the use of a completion mask, a secret that is used to conceal an encrypted data
chunk until it has been completely transferred, this processing pattern forces col-
luding parties to expend bandwidth similar to retrieving the content, and thus
removing any motivation to cheat.
Equally important for its use in practical applications, CAPnet does not
sacrifice efficiency for enhanced security. Its tools are built on computationally-
light operations (symmetric encryption and hashing). CAPnet is also designed
to be scalable; while a client needs to process a large portion of the retrieved
content when solving a puzzle, a publisher needs only to process a small, server-
configurable number of pieces to generate a challenge. Because of this asymmetry,
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our scheme can meet the deployment demands of large-scale content distribution
applications.
To demonstrate that CAPnet is effective at mitigating cache accounting at-
tacks, we configure the system parameters based on an analysis of the bandwidth
cost incurred by malicious puzzle-solving strategies. Our analysis shows that the
publisher can ensure that a malicious actor must expend a substantial amount
of bandwidth, even given unrealistically strong assumptions about the malicious
actors capabilities. To evaluate CAPnet’s efficiency, we experimentally evaluate
the computational overhead of our scheme under various configurations. The
benchmark results show that a modest client machine can solve puzzles at a rate
sufficient to confirm the retrieval of around 170 Mbps, which is enough to watch
more than 30 1080p quality videos simultaneously. Even a single core low-end
publisher machine can generate enough puzzles to support 870,000 simultaneous
views of the same video.
2 Related Work
To orient readers to current state-of-the-art defenses for cache accounting at-
tacks, this section reviews prior work done in this area. We also present infor-
mation about a related topic — proofs of data storage — and discuss why this
proof paradigm is not applicable to cache accounting attacks.
Cache accountability in peer-assisted CDNs. One technique used in peer-
assisted CDNs is to rely on the peers themselves to report statistics about con-
tent delivery. For example, clients in Akamai Netsession [2] share reports about
their upload and download activity, and this information is used to manage net-
work resources. Even some systems that exchange service for monetary rewards,
e.g., [21], rely on these types of reports to track the service contributions of peers
in order to pay them accordingly. However, in such an open environment that
allows anyone to join, peers may fabricate these accounting reports. This has
been confirmed through empirical studies [11,19].
Consequently, specialized cache accountability defenses work to address this
issue by making clients commit to these activity logs. This is done by requiring
participants to maintain tamper-evident logs, and cryptographically sign all mes-
sages sent to the network. The participants periodically exchange these logs with
a verifier. The verifier in turn checks the consistency of the reported information
and performs anomaly detection to identify cheating based on a protocol refer-
ence implementation. The repeat and compare scheme [20] utilizes this technique
to address the problem of corrupted content distribution. PeerReview [17] em-
ploys a similar approach to detect Byzantine faults. And RCA (Reliable Client
Accounting) [11] exploits such logs to address the same collusion problem we
describe in this paper. However, this approach cannot prevent colluding parties
from fabricating consistent and valid-looking log reporting content transfers that
did not take place. Thus, cheating clients and caches can still collude to collect
rewards for work they did not perform.
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A prior bandwidth puzzle-based defense, proposed by Reiter et al. [22], works
by issuing challenge puzzles to all caches and clients (which must have known
computational abilities and communication latency) that possess the content.
These parties have to solve the issued puzzles over the retrieved content in a
short period of time to receive payment. This scheme has several downsides
when compared to our approach. First, every time a new party retrieves the
content, puzzles must be solved by all peers that have a copy of this content,
even those uninvolved in the transfer. Second, the security of the scheme is based
on knowing a bound for the attacker’s hashing power, which is used to quantify
the number of challenge puzzles that must be presented within a time window.
Third, the latency of peers must also be known for the scheme to resist cheating.
This latency constraint may cause peers to lose their rewards in the event of lost
or delayed messages. In addition, an attacker that can fool others into believing
they have high latency can cheat because she has more time to solve puzzles
(including those that were supposed to be solved by other caches).
Relation with data possession proofs. Several works in the literature have
tackled a related problem — how to prove that a server to which a client has
outsourced files is actually storing those files, e.g., ensuring correct data storage
in the cloud [23]. Solutions to this problem include proofs-of-retrievability [14],
proofs of data possession [16], and proofs-of-storage [15]. Such proof systems,
at first glance, could be viewed as potential defenses against cache accounting
attacks. That is, a publisher can ask a client to prove the storage of a local
copy of the retrieved content. However, this does not confirm that caches have
served the content. These colluding caches can generate valid proofs of storage
for any client because they store the full raw content. Similarly, a client that
retrieves some content only once can produce valid proofs, for itself or others,
for all future requests that ask for the same content. While useful, these proof
systems are not applicable for fighting cache accounting attacks.
3 CAPnet Design
CAPnet defends against cache accounting attacks by both mandating proof of
delivery, and making honest choices more profitable than cheating. In this sec-
tion, we describe how the design of CAPnet manages this defense. We start by
defining the work environment for content distribution systems our scheme tar-
gets, then provide a high level view of the primary operations, after which we
present the technical details of these operations.
3.1 Work Environment Model
In the incentivized, peer-assisted content distribution systems that CAPnet tar-
gets, there are three participant types: publishers, caches, and clients. A publisher
owns content, e.g., videos or software packages, that clients want to retrieve. A
publisher hires caches to distribute this content in exchange for rewards, such
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as monetary incentives, which are tied to the amount of service these caches
provide. Each cache is defined by its IP address, which the publisher monitors
to detect Sybils. When a cache joins a publisher’s network, it gains access to
the content to be served, which we assume to be divided into equally-sized data
chunks. A client request can fetch a range of n chunks within the object, e.g.,
movie, it wants to retrieve.
During the content distribution process, a publisher acts as a dispatcher
assigning caches to fulfill client requests. Therefore, clients must contact the
publisher first, asking for n data chunks, to obtain the list of n caches that will
provide the service. The publisher selects this set randomly such that each cache
will serve a single data chunk among the requested set.
As will be shown shortly, confirming that the content has been retrieved is
done over individual content requests. In other words, even if the client wants to
retrieve a large object, e.g., a movie of size 1 GB, it computes the retrieval con-
firmation over each n chunks separately. Such an approach reduces the amount
of memory that CAPnet requires, e.g., for n = 4 and a chunk size of 1 MB, a
client/publisher would need only a 4 MB storage to hold the chunks needed for
processing any request.
CAPnet enables the publisher to set a bound on the amount of bandwidth
the attacker must expend, with respect to the original content amount, which
we call the δ-bound. So, for 4MB of content, a 0.75-bound attacker in our scheme
is expected to expend 3MB to provide a valid content retrieval confirmation for
a content request. The δ-bound is controlled by the number of rounds in the
cache accountability puzzle of CAPnet. The larger δ, the larger the computation
cost of generating and solving this puzzle. Therefore, system designers need to
configure this parameter based on the desired security-efficiency trade-off they
want to achieve.
Lastly, we work in the random oracle model, where hash functions are mod-
eled as random oracles. We also work in the ideal cipher model, where a block
cipher is modeled as a random permutation. In addition, we deal with efficient
adversaries that cannot break secure cryptographic primitives, such as AES,
SHA256, and pseudorandom functions (PRFs), with non-negligible probability.
3.2 Overview
CAPnet consists of a set of actions integrated into the content delivery process.
Collectively, these actions demonstrate that the required bandwidth amount was
actually expended, even in the face of malicious, colluding client and caches. In
what follows, we provide an intuitive discussion of these actions to highlight the
motivation behind the design (a rigorous security analysis of how these actions
defend against cache accounting attacks is found in the next section).
As shown in Figure 1, to request content in the CAPnet model, a client
retrieves a request bundle from the publisher that enables the retrieval of n data
chunks (steps 1, 2, and 3)5. This bundle stipulates which caches to contact, and
5 If the content has more than n chunks a client will send several requests.
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Fig. 1: CAPnet integration in content distribution (n is the number of caches
selected for a service request).
includes the client’s IP and a request number. In addition, the bundle contains a
puzzle, that when solved, enables the client to prove that the requested chunks
(or at least an amount of data within the δ-bound) were indeed retrieved.
The client contacts caches, possibly in parallel, and provides the request
bundle that instructs each cache what specific data chunk to serve (step 4). Each
cache will encrypt its data chunk with a unique per-request key, and additionally
encrypts the produced ciphertext using a fresh per-request completion mask
(step 5). The double encrypted chunk, appended with the completion mask, is
then delivered to the client (step 6). Once all chunks are received, the client
decrypts each chunk using the completion mask as the decryption key (step 7),
and solves the puzzle using the single-layer encrypted chunks (step 8). With the
puzzle solution the client can decrypt the data chunks to obtain the raw content
(step 8), and confirm to the publisher that these chunks were retrieved (steps
9 and 10).
When a cache begins serving content for a publisher, they establish a shared
secret called a master key. Along with the request number, both parties use this
key to non-interactively generate a fresh per-request session key that is used to
encrypt the data chunk the cache will serve. Since this key is unique and cannot
be distinguished from random6, each request returns a different, random looking,
encrypted chunk7, even if the raw content is the same. Also, since the session
key is a secret known only to the publisher and that cache, a malicious cache
does not know the encrypted content that an honest cache would serve.
In addition, CAPnet ensures that a client retrieves the entire encrypted chunk
before it can start solving the puzzle. To do this, for each request a cache selects
a random completion mask, i.e., a random key, that is used to encrypt the chunk
ciphertext. In other words, the cache adds a second layer of encryption using the
6 This is by the security of PRFs.
7 Recall that we work in the ideal cipher model.
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completion mask as the encryption key. The cache appends the completion mask
to the transmitted, double encrypted chunk. Thus, the client has to download
the entire chunk before being able to unmask any part of it.
A puzzle is computed by processing small (e.g., 16 byte long) pieces of the
(single-layer) encrypted chunks. Starting at a randomly selected piece in the first
chunk, one computes the hash of this piece and maps it to a piece index in the
second data chunk. In the random oracle model, this mapping randomly jumps
to a piece in the second chunk. The hash is now computed over the previous hash
and the second piece and is used to select another piece in the third chunk, and
so on. Once the data chunk from each cache is visited, this completes a round.
The next round is begun by mapping the last hash of the prior round to a piece
index in the first chunk. This continues for the number of rounds chosen by the
publisher to achieve the desired δ-bound.
The publisher and the client compute the puzzle in slightly different ways.
The publisher randomly chooses a “starting piece” in the first chunk and com-
putes one puzzle to produce a challenge for the client. This challenge does not
contain any information about the starting piece. Hence, the client will attempt
to solve the challenge by computing candidate, or trial, puzzles initiated at var-
ious starting pieces in the first chunk until the solution is found. This forces the
client to process a δ portion of the content before finding the solution.
Increasing δ strengthens the security guarantees of CAPnet by causing ma-
licious parties to retrieve more content, but also increases the computation cost
for publishers and honest clients as larger number of rounds are needed. Caches,
on the other hand, have uniform computational cost independent of the δ-bound.
3.3 Design Details
We now describe the CAPnet actions in more detail, including puzzle generation,
solving, and verification.
Puzzle Generation The publisher generates a challenge puzzle based on the
data chunks a client wants to retrieve. Figure 2 depicts this action through a
clarifying example involving two data chunks. In this figure, L stands for location,
H stands for hashing, E stands for encryption, || is a concatenation operation,
and the arrows indicate the sequence of pieces selected when computing a puzzle.
As shown, a puzzle starts at the first data chunk and proceeds by processing
a number of small data pieces selected at random. Given that a puzzle round
processes encrypted pieces, the publisher encrypts the piece selected at each
step. It then hashes the encrypted piece along with prior hash or location value.
The output hash is mapped to a piece index within the next chunk (or the first
chunk is this is the beginning of a new round).
This computation pattern imposes three aspects. First, each location value
encapsulates all encrypted pieces processed so far, which enforces sequential
computation of the puzzle. Second, processing encrypted pieces prevents any
correlation between puzzles generated for different requests, even if they are for
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Fig. 2: An example of puzzle challenge generation with two chunks and two
rounds. The puzzle challenge is H(L5) and its solution is L5.
the same raw content. Third, touching all data chunks in a round robin order
makes all chunks contribute equally in solving a puzzle. This ensures that a
puzzle solution is computed over all chunks, confirming their retrieval.
Once the puzzle computation is completed, which happens when the des-
ignated number of rounds is reached, the publisher uses the hash of the last
location, i.e., H(L5) in the figure, as the challenge, and it asks the client to
return the preimage of this hash, i.e., L5. This is done without revealing piece1.
Instead, the client tries all data pieces in the first chunk. Hiding the starting
piece causes the client to touch a large percentage of the pieces in each chunk
while enabling the publisher to touch very few. This minimizes the computa-
tional load for publishers, allowing them to process a large number of client
requests concurrently.
The technical details of this process are captured by Algorithm 1. In this
algorithm, Dj is the j
th data chunk, piecei is the i
th data piece in a data chunk,
Rpuzzle is the number of puzzle rounds, and piecestotal is the total number of
pieces in any data chunk. The data pieces inside a chunk are referenced using
their indices, where the first piece has an index 0, the second has an index 1,
and so on. We use index(·) to denote the index of a given piece.
Algorithm 1 shows two phases: an initialization phase, and a challenge prepa-
ration phase. The initialization phase is needed to allow caches and the publisher
to agree on the encryption setup. We use AES in the counter mode (AES-CTR)
for encryption because it allows a publisher to encrypt any individual data piece
without encrypting the whole data chunk. To generate identical encrypted data,
the publisher and each cache Cj must generate the same session key kj and the
initial value of the AES-CTR counter ctrj,initial.
Generating the AES-CTR counter and session key is done using a one time
setup without any per-request interaction between the publisher and cache. As
mentioned before, a cache Cj shares a master key with the publisher that they
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Algorithm 1 Puzzle challenge generator.
1: Input: Data chunks D1, . . . , Dn
2: Output: Challenge
3: /* Initialization */
4: for j = 1 to n do
5: Generate kj and ctrj,initial
6: end for
7: /* Puzzle generation */
8: Select index(piece1) randomly from D1
9: Set j = 1, L1 = 0, r = n ·Rpuzzle
10: for i = 1 to r do
11: Fetch piecei from Dj based on index(piecei)
12: /* Compute ctri and encrypt piecei */
13: ctri = index(piecei) + ctrj,initial
14: ci = AES-CTR(kj , ctri, piecei)
15: /* Compute location and index of piecei+1 */
16: Li+1 = SHA256(Li||ci)
17: index(piecei+1) = Li+1 mod piecestotal
18: j = (j mod n) + 1
19: end for
20: Set Challenge = SHA256(Lr+1)
21: return Challenge
both use to derive any future session key kj . This is done by means of a pseu-
dorandom function (PRF) keyed with this master key, and evaluated over the
request number and the client IP to output kj . The same PRF idea, but keyed
with the session key, is used to generate ctrj,initial. Accordingly, in the initial-
ization phase, the publisher generates all keys and counters for all data chunks
that will be used by the caches involved in the service session.
The puzzle generation phase proceeds as described previously. After selecting
a piece index at random from the first data chunk, the publisher proceeds by
computing the location of the next piece (line 16), and mapping this location to
a piece index (line 17). The new location computation requires encrypting the
prior piece, which in turn requires computing the correct AES-CTR counter value
(line 13). By doing so, the publisher produces the same ciphertext of the selected
piece that a cache will produce. The aforementioned process is repeated for the
required number of iterations, as found in lines 10-19. Lastly, the algorithm
outputs the hash of the last location as the puzzle challenge.
After the puzzle is generated, the publisher informs the client about the
puzzle challenge it has to solve as part of the request bundle mentioned earlier.
To allow the client to decrypt the retrieved data chunks, the publisher can either
provide the keys in response to the puzzle solution reported by the client, or
simply encrypt all session keys using the puzzle solution and share the ciphertext
as part of the request bundle. Either way, once the client solves the challenge
puzzle it can recover these keys and decrypt the received data.
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Puzzle Solving The client receives the puzzle challenge, along with the cache
contact information, within the request bundle sent by the publisher. With this
bundle, the client can start the content retrieval process, where it connects with
the listed caches and requests the specified data chunks. Caches will deliver
double-layer encrypted chunks, with the completion mask appended to each
chunk. The client uses the completion mask as the decryption key to remove the
second encryption layer of the chunk. By repeating this process for all chunks,
the client obtains the single-layer encrypted data chunks.
The client can now perform the second action in the CAPnet process —
solving the challenge puzzle. It uses a similar algorithm to the one used by the
publisher with three differences. First, since the client retrieves encrypted data
chunks from the caches, it does not encrypt the data pieces before applying the
hash, thus skipping lines 4-6 and 13-14 in Algorithm 1. Second, since the client
does not know the starting piece, it computes a puzzle for every piece in the
first data chunk until the correct solution is found. In other words, it repeats
lines 9-11 for each candidate starting piece. And third, once the client solves the
puzzle, the output is the puzzle solution, which is the last location in the correct
puzzle.
Puzzle Verification The last action in the CAPnet process is verifying the
correctness of the reported puzzle solution. While it would be possible to keep
a record of the puzzle challenges and their solutions for each client, we devise
a computationally-lightweight technique that does not require maintaining any
per-client state.
In this technique, the publisher generates a unique secret token for each
content request. This is done by evaluating a secret PRF over the concatenation
of the request number and the client IP. The publisher then encrypts the secret
token using the puzzle solution, and sends the encrypted token to the client as
part of the request bundle. Once the client solves the puzzle, it can decrypt the
token and send it back to the publisher along with the request number. The
publisher can simply evaluate the secret PRF over the request number and the
client IP, and thus, verifies whether the output equals to the token value reported
by the client. This enables the publisher to quickly check the correctness of a
puzzle solution.
4 Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the effectiveness of CAPnet in fighting cache ac-
counting attacks. We begin by outlining the setup of this analysis, after which
we discuss how the security of CAPnet changes as the design parameters change.
4.1 Setup
The analysis setup defines how we model our adversaries, and explains the se-
curity properties that CAPnet is designed to achieve. The set of notations that
this analysis uses is shown in Table 1.
10
Table 1: Notations.
Symbol Meaning
n Total number of caches in a service session.
Cm Set of malicious caches in a service session.
m Number of malicious caches in a service session, where m ≤ n.
hsize Hash output size.
chunksize Data chunk size.
piecesize Data piece size, where piecesize ≤ hsizem .
piecestotal Total number of pieces in a data chunk, where piecestotal =
chunksize
piecesize
.
Rpuzzle Number of puzzle rounds.
Y A random variable that represents the number of pieces a malicious
puzzle solver retrieves.
E[Y ] The expectation of Y .
δ The ratio between the bandwidth amount a malicious puzzle solver
would spend and the amount that an honest solver would use. This is
computed as δ = E[Y ]
n·piecestotal .
Adversary Model. We consider a client colluding with a set of m ≥ 1 caches8.
(If a client does not collude with any cache, it must retrieve all the data chunks
to solve the puzzle just like an honest client.) This collusion can be modeled as
an interaction between two parties: the client and a collective entity Cm. Any
cache Cj in Cm can pool all encrypted data chunks from the rest of the malicious
caches at a very low cost. That is, given that each cache has a full copy of the
raw content, Cj needs only the session keys of these caches to produce their
encrypted data chunks locally. When we say that a client retrieves data pieces
from Cm, we mean that this client is interacting with the cache that pooled the
data chunks.
In order to have a strong bound on attacker capabilities, we consider an
attacker with full knowledge about the piece distribution across all the trial
puzzles a client will compute. In other words, the attacker knows the selection
frequency of data pieces, i.e., how many times a piece has been processed by all
puzzles, in all chunks rather than just in the puzzles for which this attacker has
enough prior pieces. The attacker may use this information to retrieve the most
frequent pieces when solving the challenge puzzle.
Despite the hash function being modeled as a random oracle with a uniform
and random output, this piece frequency still matters. Suppose that we have a
8 All these caches are different, i.e., not Sybils run on the same machine. This is due
to the assumption that a publisher monitors the IP addresses of its caches to detect
Sybils.
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chunk composed of 4 pieces that are randomly chosen to be in 4 trial puzzles.
Over 90% of the time one of these pieces is chosen at least twice (only about
9% of random draws of 4 items choose one from each). On average more than 1
piece is likely not to be chosen for any trial puzzle. An intelligent attacker would
choose the piece used in the most trial puzzles since it gives the greatest chance
to solve the challenge. So, accounting for the fact that the actual frequencies are
not uniform, even with a random function, more accurately models the attacker’s
capabilities. Furthermore, providing the attacker perfect information about these
actual frequencies implies that the security bound we infer will be conservative.
The client and Cm want to solve the puzzle while expending as little band-
width as possible. In quantifying this cost, we compute the download bandwidth
consumption for the colluding group.
Our adversary model is subject to the following assumptions:
A1. Secure cryptographic primitives. Adversaries cannot efficiently break
the basic cryptographic building blocks (SHA256, AES, and PRFs) with
non-negligible probability.
A2. Clients do not already possess the content. At the beginning of a
service session, a client does not have a copy of the content it will request.
This can be achieved by having publishers track which clients have retrieved
which content. However, even if this assumption is violated, the client still
must retrieve data chunks from honest caches in order to solve a puzzle,
leading to the retrieval of at least δ = n−mn of the requested chunks.
A3. Free adversarial metadata communication. It is difficult to know the
minimal size of information adversaries would need to communicate when
coordinating the puzzle solving process. Therefore, we will just assume that
such costs are free from a bandwidth standpoint and only count data piece
transmission. While it ignores some cost, this makes the overhead numbers
conservative in that real attackers will incur more cost than what we predict.
A4. Content is already compressed. The raw content distributed by caches
is already compressed. As such, a malicious cache who intends to compress
the raw content before encrypting it will only save a very small bandwidth
amount.
In addition to the above, and as mentioned previously, we work in the random
oracle model (i.e., hash functions are modeled as random oracles), and in the
ideal cipher model (i.e., block ciphers are modeled as random permutations).
An intelligent client and Cm collaborate to solve the puzzle while transferring
the least amount of data possible. In this collaboration, the client receives en-
crypted chunks only from honest caches, while Cm produce all encrypted chunks
of malicious caches by pooling their session keys as explained previously. (We
consider that Cm have pooled the data to simplify our analysis.) The strategy
then will have a solver, either the client or Cm, that attempts to solve the puzzle
using the chunks it has in addition to information it requests from the second
party, whichever of the client or Cm is not the solver. The second party acts as
a piece provider which sends pieces or hashes (i.e., piece locations computed in
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a puzzle round) to the solver. For reasons we will see shortly, pieces make more
sense for the attacker to transmit.
As our analysis will show, the client and Cm can decide in advance which
party will play which role based on which option incurs the least bandwidth cost.
This decision depends on the number of malicious caches m. If this number is
less than half, i.e., m < n2 , it is more efficient for the client to act as the solver.
If it is greater than half, it is more efficient for the client to let Cm solve the
challenge puzzle. If the number of caches is exactly half, it is equally efficient
regardless of who is the solver.
Other attack strategies may involve attacking the cryptographic primitives
used in CAPnet design. This may include trying to find the preimage of the
puzzle challenge by inverting the hash, or predicting the session keys used by
honest caches to produce their encrypted chunks locally by a colluding cache. By
the security of the underlying cryptographic primitives CAPnet employs, i.e., the
use of secure PRFs and first-preimage resistant hash functions, such strategies
will succeed with negligible probability.
It should be noted that the above list is not known to be comprehensive.
There could be other attack strategies outside the analysis presented in this sec-
tion (although we are not aware of any of such strategies). Performing a rigorous
analysis over the full potential threat space is an open problem for future work.
Security Goal. The goal is to ensure that a malicious puzzle solver cannot solve
the challenge puzzle in CAPnet unless it expends, on average, a bandwidth
amount equivalent to retrieving at least δ portion of the content. This means
that the colluding group is expected to expend a total of nδchunksize bandwidth
units. So for δ = 0.95, the attacker has an expected value of 95% of the band-
width cost even if all metadata overhead are ignored. System designers may set
the value of δ based on the security-efficiency trade-off they want to achieve.
A larger δ value provides stronger security guarantees, but also increases the
computational cost of generating and solving puzzles.
It is not practical to have δ = 1 unless the publisher touches every piece
of the requested chunks. Since each chunk must be encrypted with a fresh key,
this cost is prohibitive. In fact, if the publisher is willing to touch (and encrypt)
every piece, it is simpler to compute the hash of the encrypted chunks, and use
this hash as the content retrieval confirmation that a client has to compute.
However, this would greatly reduce performance. Assuming that the publisher
does not touch every piece, then δ < 1 for the following reason. Suppose that
the attacker retrieves every piece of the content except one. If this piece was not
touched by the publisher, the attacker can prove that the content was retrieved
with δ < 1. Since we only account for the piece transfer costs, at least some of
the time (when the attacker does not retrieve untouched pieces) δ < 1, which
makes the expected value of all cases to be less than 1.
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4.2 Analysis of Puzzle Solving Strategies
In what follows, we analyze the bandwidth cost of the malicious puzzle solving
strategies described earlier, and show how to configure CAPnet’s design param-
eters to achieve the desired δ-bound. These parameters include the data piece
size piecesize and the number of puzzle rounds Rpuzzle.
As mentioned previously, an attacker who wishes to solve the puzzle without
retrieving all the data chunks will either exchange hashes or retrieve data pieces.
By setting the piecesize ≤ hsizem one can ensure that the cost of transmitting
a hash is no less than transmitting pieces. That is, even in the event when the
piece provider has m consecutive encrypted chunks, meaning that given one hash
value the provider can process m pieces in a puzzle round, transmitting a hash
is more expensive than transmitting these m pieces. In fact since the pieces may
be used in multiple puzzle trials, it is better for the solver to retrieve them. For
this reason, we focus on strategies that involve piece dissemination instead.
When retrieving data pieces to solve the challenge puzzle, we conjecture that
the best strategy for the solver is to utilize its knowledge of the piece distribution
across all trial puzzles. Initially, the solver must possess some piece of each
encrypted data chunk to have a chance to solve the puzzle, since each round
touches all encrypted data chunks. In order to get pieces from the honest caches,
the client must download all double-layer encrypted chunks held by these caches.
For malicious caches, the client can retrieve the individual pieces it desires. In
selecting which pieces to retrieve, the best approach is to ask for the piece that
gives the greatest chance of solving the puzzle. The solver can ask the piece
provider to send the piece with the highest frequency among the remaining
pieces, and then determine if it enables solving the challenge puzzle. This process
continues until the solution is found. Assuming that retrieving the most popular
missing piece is optimal, this is the optimal strategy for the malicious solver.
Recall that either the client or a cache (Cm) may play the role of the puzzle
solver. If a cache is the puzzle solver, the client must still be the one to download
the chunks from honest caches since the source IP of the request is checked.
Hence, the client retrieval from honest caches is a fixed cost. Once this happens,
it is more efficient for the party with the most content (either the client or Cm)
to act as the solver and get as few pieces as possible from the other party. This
means that when m < n2 , the client will have a larger number of chunks than
Cm, thus, the client will be the puzzle solver. On the other hand, when m >
n
2 ,
Cm will be the puzzle solver asking the client to send pieces from the chunks it
received from honest caches. When m = n2 , either party can be the puzzle solver.
Analyzing the bandwidth cost of the above strategy allows us to configure
the number of puzzle rounds to obtain a specific δ-bound. In order to do so, we
compute the expected number of pieces E[Y ] the colluding group will retrieve as
a function of Rpuzzle and the number of malicious caches m. Then, we compute
δ = E[Y ]n·piecestotal , after which we select Rpuzzle that satisfies the desired δ-bound.
To compute E[Y ], we conduct simulations in which we mimic the above strat-
egy and track the number of retrieved pieces. As an example, we consider the
following setup, which we believe is similar to what is used in practical con-
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Table 2: The δ-bound for various m and Rpuzzle values, n = 6 caches (R is
Rpuzzle). For m < 3 the client is a more efficient puzzle solver, for m > 3 Cm is
a more efficient puzzle solver, m = 3 is equivalent for each.
Client as solver Either Cache as solver
R
m
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 1 0.87±0.03 0.78±0.06 0.71±0.08 0.45±0.06 0.21±0.03 0
2 1 0.91±0.04 0.86±0.06 0.82±0.08 0.52±0.06 0.24±0.04 0
3 1 0.93±0.04 0.9±0.05 0.87±0.07 0.57 ±0.05 0.26±0.04 0
4 1 0.94±0.03 0.92±0.05 0.91±0.06 0.59±0.05 0.28±0.03 0
5 1 0.95±0.03 0.94±0.04 0.93±0.04 0.6±0.05 0.29±0.03 0
6 1 0.96±0.03 0.95±0.04 0.94±0.04 0.61±0.04 0.29±0.03 0
7 1 0.96±0.02 0.95±0.02 0.95±0.04 0.62±0.04 0.3±0.03 0
8 1 0.97±0.02 0.96±0.03 0.95±0.03 0.63±0.03 0.3±0.02 0
9 1 0.97±0.02 0.97±0.03 0.96±0.03 0.63±0.03 0.3±0.02 0
10 1 0.97±0.02 0.97±0.03 0.97±0.03 0.64±0.03 0.31±0.02 0
tent distribution applications. We set chunksize = 1 MB, and piecesize = 16
bytes, leading to piecestotal = 2
16 pieces. We have Rpuzzle ∈ {1, . . . , 10}, n = 6,
and m ∈ {1, . . . , 6}. The simulations are repeated 103 times, where E[Y ], and
consequently δ, is computed as the average across all runs. We also report the
standard deviation of our measurements. The computed δ values are found in
Table 2.
As shown, as the number of rounds increases, δ increases. This is expected
because a larger number of puzzle rounds means that the challenge puzzle re-
quires a larger number of pieces to be solved. Consequently, the puzzle solver
is expected to retrieve more content in order to find these pieces. On the other
hand, δ decreases as the number of malicious caches increases for a fixed Rpuzzle
value. Again, this is expected because more malicious caches makes the collusion
more effective.
Note that scenarios where Cm is the solver have significantly lower δ values.
This is because Cm already possesses the majority of the content that has been
pooled at no cost (since we assume that metadata retrieval, such as keys, is
free, pooling session keys costs no bandwidth). To solve the challenge puzzle,
Cm only needs to retrieve the missing pieces from the client who has the data
chunks from the honest caches.
Notice that as one would expect, once the piece provider and solver have their
pieces it does not matter which party was a client or a cache originally. To see
this, examine δ in Table 2. Notice that the points with m = 2 and m = 4 have a
difference of 0.33 (within the margin of error). This is because the attacker either
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retrieves 26 or
4
6 of the content, a difference of 0.33. However, in either case, a
party with 46 of the content acts as a solver while the party with
2
6 provides
pieces. Similar symmetries are found with m = 1 and m = 5 (a difference of
0.66) and m = 0 and m = 6 (a difference of 1). This illustrates that once a piece
provider and solver have their content, the cost of solving the puzzle is uniform
regardless of which party is the client and which is a cache.
5 Evaluation
In order to understand how CAPnet’s security impacts efficiency, this section
evaluates performance in the context of content distribution applications. Given
that CAPnet imposes a minimal bandwidth cost to exchange a puzzle challenge
and its solution, what is left to measure is its computational overhead. Towards
this end, we conduct empirical experiments to answer the following specific ques-
tions:
– How fast can a publisher generate challenge puzzles?
– How quickly can a client solve these puzzles?
– How does the configuration of the design parameters affect these results?
– What do these numbers mean for a practical deployment?
The rest of this section describes our methodology and discusses the signifi-
cance of the obtained results.
5.1 Methodology
To establish our benchmarks, we measured the rate, in puzzles per second, at
which a publisher can generate challenge puzzles, and the rate at which a client
can solve these puzzles. For the publisher, we considered the case of popular
content that large numbers of clients routinely request in close time intervals.
For the client, we computed the puzzle solving rate based on the average case,
meaning that a client tries half the starting pieces in the first data chunk to find
the solution.
Our experiments were conducted on a modest publisher server with an AMD
Ryzen 3 2200G processor and 16 GiB of memory, and a low-end client machine
with an Intel Core i7-4600U processor and 8 GiB of memory. Each puzzle gener-
ator and solver has been called at least 5,000,000 and 5,000 times, respectively.
Unless otherwise mentioned, all graphs use Rpuzzle = 5, chunksize = 1 MB,
hsize = 32 bytes, and piecesize = 16 bytes. In addition, instead of reporting the
puzzle rate for puzzle generator and solver, we compute the bitrate at which con-
tent can be requested using these puzzles. Despite both the client and publisher
operations being embarrassingly parallelizable, we run each on a single core to
show the per-core performance.
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(a) Generator speed, δ effect. (b) Generator speed, chunksize effect
(c) Generator speed, piecesize effect
Fig. 3: Generator speed for various configurations (n is the number of caches in
a service session).
5.2 Results
Publisher’s bitrate vs δ. We begin by measuring the puzzle generation rate
while varying the number of puzzle rounds Rpuzzle and number of caches n
with one malicious cache (Figure 3a). As shown in the figure, we compute the
δ-bound value that corresponds to each Rpuzzle value. This produced a curve
from 1 round (upper left point on each curve) to 10 rounds (lower right point).
The bitrate decreases as δ increases because with larger Rpuzzle the publisher
processes a larger number of pieces when preparing the challenge, which reduces
the puzzle generation rate. On the other hand, an increased number of caches n
increases the throughput because more data is served per challenge puzzle. This
factor also affects the δ-bound of CAPnet. As shown in the figure, for larger n
the range δ gets larger for all Rpuzzle values. That is, the impact of having a
malicious cache decreases when n gets larger. This captures what happens in
real life, where it will be harder for caches to collude effectively when there is a
large number of caches per session. Based on the figure, setting Rpuzzle ≥ 5 in
practice provides a reasonable δ-bound for n ≥ 4 (δ ≥ 0.93), with diminishing
returns thereafter.
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(a) Solver speed, δ effect. (b) Solver speed, chunksize effect
(c) Solver speed, piecesize effect
Fig. 4: Solver speed for various configurations (n is the number of caches in a
service session).
Client’s bitrate vs δ. Figure 4a shows the bitrate vs δ-bound for the puz-
zle solver. As shown, for a fixed Rpuzzle value, the client’s effective bandwidth is
relatively uniform independent of the number of caches n. However, the Rpuzzle
value, for a fixed n, has substantial impact on the effective bandwidth of a client.
Given that the reported speed in the figure dwarfs the 5 Mbps Netflix 1080p qual-
ity video rate [7], even using Rpuzzle = 5 (the 5
th point on each curve starting
from the left), our modest client machine is able to watch dozens of 1080p videos
concurrently. If higher performance is desired, then reducing Rpuzzle, i.e., reduc-
ing δ, provides drastically better performance, up to 900Mbps, if needed.
How does chunksize impact client and publisher bitrates? We mea-
sured the puzzle generation and solving rates for various data chunk sizes and
n values (results are shown in Figures 3b and 4b). The chunksize has a large
effect on the performance of publishers, but minimal effect on client’s perfor-
mance. There are several reasons for this difference. The publisher has almost a
fixed puzzle generation rate regardless of the chunk size, because it processes the
same number of pieces for fixed Rpuzzle, piecesize, and n values. Consequently,
a larger chunksize makes the amount of content served per challenge puzzle
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larger. Alternatively, for a client the puzzle solving rate decreases with larger
chunksize because the client has to try a larger number of trial puzzles. When
computing the bitrate for some n value, the low puzzle rates are multiplied by
large chunksize and vice versa. For this reason the client bandwidth is somewhat
similar for all chunksize values.
How does piecesize impact client and publisher bitrates? To under-
stand how to set the piece size, we studied its effect on publisher (Figure 3c) and
client (Figure 4c) performance. The publisher can generate enough puzzles to
serve over 3 Tbps, regardless of the piece size. However, a piece size of 16 bytes is
slightly more efficient because AES-CTR works on 16 byte blocks for encryption.
In addition, a smaller piece size means that the publisher processes a smaller
amount of content for a fixed number of pieces. The client, on the other hand,
tends to benefit from larger piece sizes because they reduce the number of start-
ing pieces, and hence, trial puzzles, a client has to compute. Given that a client
with piecesize = 16 byte already has a high throughput, and given that publish-
ers are usually heavy-loaded entities, we recommend the use of piecesize = 16
bytes to boost publisher performance.
Contextualizing our results. To ground our results in real world num-
bers, we examined the customer demand from the popular content provider
Netflix.com. Netflix serves 1080p video at a bitrate of approximately 5 Mbps [7].
As shown in Figure 3b, and taking n = 4 caches, a publisher in our setup, us-
ing a single core machine, can generate puzzles for 136,000 requests per second,
which translates to 544,000 data chunks per second. To understand this load,
we look at a popular show, “House of Cards”, where 5.4 million of its 83 mil-
lion subscribers (as of 2015) watched at least one episode within a month of its
release [5]. Since the report does not indicate how many of those views were
concurrent, it is not possible to infer the exact peak load. However, our single
core publisher supports concurrent viewing from 870,000 clients which is enough
to support a simultaneous viewing peak from 1/6 of the total views at any point
during the first month.
As for the client, the previous results showed that for Rpuzzle = 5, on average
our low-end client is able to solve enough puzzles to retrieve at least 170 Mbps
using a single core (Figure 4b). This is more than 34 times the rate required to
retrieve the same popular 1080p video [7].
In summary, the previous results demonstrate that CAPnet is computationally-
lightweight. Its security in fighting cache accounting attacks is substantial (δ >
0.95 with generous attacker assumptions), even at bandwidth values that sup-
port a publisher serving thousands of clients or a client simultaneously watching
dozens of 1080p videos.
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6 Conclusions
In this paper, we introduce CAPnet, a low-overhead solution to defend against
cache accounting attacks in peer-assisted CDNs. CAPnet is the first system that
forces malicious caches, even when colluding with clients, to expend substantial
bandwidth to demonstrate that content was retrieved. This is done by intro-
ducing a cache accountability puzzle that provides strong protections even given
unrealistically strong assumptions about the attacker’s capabilities. For example,
with a 5 round puzzle, if 3 malicious caches out of 6 total caches wish to perform
a cache accounting attack, the colluding parties would retrieve on average more
than 0.95 of the requested content (δ > 0.95). We analyze the security of CAP-
net, and show experimentally that it incurs a low computation cost, enabling a
modest client to retrieve 170Mbps from a modest publisher serving several Tbps.
This demonstrates the viability of employing our scheme in large scale content
distribution applications.
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